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1. Introduction 
The emergence of the term ‘Europeanization’ reflects a growing desire to catalogue and 
explain the various feedback processes between the different administrative levels of 
what is now widely perceived to be a multi-level system of governance in the EU.  
However, there is no single, all-encompassing ‘theory’ of Europeanization, and even its 
basic meaning remains contested.  However, the mainstream opinion is that 
Europeanization research should seek to understand the domestic impacts of European 
integration (Jordan, 2002a; 2003).  Boerzel (2002, 6) simply describes it as a “process 
whereby domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy 
making.”  According to this view, which I shall employ in this paper, Europeanization 
concerns the process through which European integration penetrates and, in certain 
circumstances brings about adjustments to, domestic policy systems. 
 
For the sake of convenience, I shall concentrate on the Europeanization of the content, 
structure and style national environmental policy, while recognizing that in practice 
these aspects of national ‘policy’ are subtly interrelated.  Following Hall (1993), policy 
content can be divided into three different levels. The first relates to the precise setting 
of policy instruments (e.g. the level of emission standards or taxes, the chemicals 
included in ‘grey’ and ‘black’ lists, etc.).  The second is the instruments or techniques 
by which policy goals are attained (e.g. direct regulation, fiscal instruments, or 
voluntary agreements).  The third level comprises the overall goals that guide policy. 
These goals operate within a policy paradigm or a ‘framework of ideas and standards 
that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used 
to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing’ 
(Hall, 1993: 279).   
 
The concept of policy structure is potentially very broad, which raises some problems 
defining its boundaries, not least in relation to policy style. National institutional 
structures range from the basic building blocks of the state (e.g. departments, agencies, 
etc) through to policy coordination networks, codes, guidelines, and ‘ways of working’ 
(Peters, 1999: 28, 146; Bulmer and Burch, 1998; 2000).  The more cultural aspects of 
national policy structure – the norms and values associated with administrative work 
(e.g. Bulmer & Burch, 1998; 2000) – will be dealt with here separately as policy style.  
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In defining policy style, we follow the argument that a society's ‘standard operating 
procedures for making and implementing policies’ (Richardson et al., 1982: 2) can be 
characterized along two axes: (1) a government's approach to problem solving, ranging 
from anticipatory/active to reactive, and (2) a government's relationship to other actors 
in the policy-making and implementation process, characterized by their inclination 
either to reach consensus with organized groups or to impose decisions.  
 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section Two offers a broad overview 
of the overall trends in the Europeanization of national environmental policy since c. 
1970.  Section Three describes the policy background in the UK, which is now being 
progressively Europeanized by the EU.  Section Four analyses the Europeanization of 
the content, structure and style of national policy, and Section Five offers some 
concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Overview 
The Europeanization of British
1 environmental policy has been much more deep-seated 
and wide-ranging than one would expect to find in a state with a long history of 
environmental concern and a reluctant attitude to European integration.  In order to 
understand this puzzling outcome we have to view Europeanization as the outcome of 
two intimately interconnected processes of social and political change - modern 
environmentalism and European integration.  Ultimately, European integration has 
given domestic environmentalism much greater force and potency, by embedding 
national environmental policy in EU law.  Although intended as an economic step, EU 
membership has also brought Britain into closer contact with continental European 
states (namely Germany and the Netherlands) that adopted the philosophy of ecological 
modernization before it did.  Moreover, once a reluctant ‘taker’ of policy determined in 
Brussels, the unexpectedly deep and politically painful Europeanization of national 
environmental policy, has forced Britain to take positive steps to ‘shape’ EU policy in 
its own image. 
 
Britain’s antipathy to the EU is deeply rooted in its history, society, political systems 
(Rasmussen, 2001).   The European Commission’s Eurobarometer polls consistently  4 
reveal a considerably lower level of public support for integration among the British 
public than in just about any other state apart from Denmark.  The British feel 
geographically and politically different to the rest of the EU, which they joined largely 
as an act of economic necessity.  The image of the EU as a “place of British failure” 
(Young, 1998, 3) is lodged deep in the national psyche.  Because of this, Britain has 
found it difficult to commit itself fully to the EU and to playing the Brussels game.  It 
has, for example, been conspicuously poor at uploading policy models to the EU.  The 
first clear-cut example was probably the single market programme in the mid 1980s, 
although this generated many unintended consequences and sowed the seeds of Mrs 
Thatcher’s eventual downfall in 1990 (Young, 1998). 
 
Britain decided to join the EU for entirely pragmatic reasons.  It has always been 
suspicious of Europe’s ‘non-market’ agenda encompassing issues such as health and 
social security.  Although Britain has always had a large number of relatively powerful 
environmental pressure groups, the environment has never been the focus of sustained 
party political conflict.  These political (there has never been a stable pro-integration 
discourse in Britain) and economic factors (the state owned or sponsored key industries 
such as water, energy and farming) encouraged Britain to protect the status quo against 
what were widely perceived as unwanted political impositions from Brussels.  Britain 
had developed an extensive system of environmental law and policy that fitted its 
history (strong social demands for animal welfare; much weaker demands for pollution 
control), legal system (common rather than Roman law) and geographical 
characteristics (an island state), and felt resentful about external impositions made by 
the EU.  Although there were some areas where the national Department of the 
Environment (DoE) successfully took the initiative in Europe (or at least supported 
European solutions), they were far “fewer than might have been expected of a country 
with such a well established environmental policy” (Haigh, 1984, 302).  In many 
respects, Britain’s suffered the first mover disadvantage of having innovated before 
other EU states, using tools that were peculiar to national conditions and circumstances.  
During the 1980s, the DoE’s half-hearted attempts to upload British policy to the EU 
coupled to the increasingly vocal pressure group community’s attempts to have the 
                                                                                                                                            
1 This paper is mostly concerned with matters in England, Scotland and Wales, hence the term Britain 
rather than United Kingdom.  5 
expanding acquis fully enforced, produced an increasingly large ‘misfit’ between the 
requirements of EU and British policy. 
 
The crunch came in the 1980s when Britain’s geographical and political insularity came 
under sustained pressure from other Member States seeking to re-distribute the burden 
of environmental improvement in Europe.  The DoE’s response (neutering 
Europeanization by subverting key Directives) not only conspicuously failed to stem 
the tide of change but also lumbered Britain with a reputation for being ‘The Dirty Man 
of Europe’, that made it difficult to engage positively with the EU.  The 
Europeanization of British environmental policy began to move into a more proactive 
phase in the mid 1980s as Prime Minister Mrs Thatcher turned her attention first to 
Europe (the single market programme, after c. 1984) then to the environment (c. 1988), 
without ever fully appreciating the connections between the two (Jordan, 2002a).  Until 
that point, she had been agnostic about Europe and deeply suspicious of 
environmentalists.  By the early 1990s, the Europeanization of national policy had 
progressed so far that simply vetoing new proposals in the Environment Council, was 
no longer a viable response.  Today, we find Britain proactively exporting its own 
homespun environmental ideas with a passion that would have been simply 
unimaginable even fifteen years ago. 
 
The  remainder of this paper explores the Europeanization of British environmental 
policy structures, policy style and policy content.  It reveals that Europeanization was 
mostly unintended and largely unforeseen at the time of Britain’s entry, although, 
paradoxically, the long-term outcomes of this transformation are now widely regarded 
as having benefited Britain.  Europeanization has therefore been a serendipitous 
process, which has made the domestic environmental policy sector more environmental 
and considerably more European than it would otherwise have been.  No longer is 
Britain ‘The Dirty Man of Europe’.  In fact, nowadays, it is more likely to be criticized 
for domesticating the EU by successfully uploading its political preference for 
environmental policy integration (EPI), greater subsidiarity, stronger implementation, 
and the timely review and revision of outdated legislation.  In many ways these are an 
expression of Britain’s deep, historical attachment to matters of administrative 
excellence (or ‘good governance’).  But in some continental Member States, these  6 
increasingly communautaire innovations are perceived as a clever ploy to blunt EU 
environmental policy. 
 
3.  National Attitudes to Europe and the Environment 
Attitudes to the EU 
The national political-administrative system in Britain has never committed itself 
wholly to European integration.  It is variously “aloof and sceptical” (Rasmussen, 2001, 
145), “an awkward partner” (George, 1994), and a “spectator… rather than an actor... in 
a continental drama from which Britain… chose to exclude herself” (Young, 1998, 1).  
Britain joined the EU much later than the three largest member states, France, Italy and 
Germany, and then more for pragmatic than principled reasons.  Several explanations 
have been advanced to explain its attitude, including its geography (an island), history 
(not invaded since 1066), institutional structure (adversarial party politics), economy 
(trans-Atlantic) and deep socio-cultural attachment to national sovereignty.  With a few 
notable exceptions (i.e. the Heath (1970-4) and Blair (1997- ) governments, and 
Thatcher’s very brief (1984-6) flirtation with the single market programme), British 
governments have always seen European integration as a “disagreeable necessity rather 
than a positive benefit” (Gowland and Turner, 2000, 5). 
 
The absence of a consistent, bipartisan political discourse between the two main 
political parties supporting European integration, has produced a “staccato” like series 
of negotiating positions - often negative, sometimes positive but never consistently one 
or the other (Wallace, 1995, 49).  When things have gone badly (as they often have!), 
the British instinctively stand aloof rather than work inside the EU to Anglicize it.  
Over the years, pro-Europeanists have realised that the best way to ‘sell’ Europe to 
Britain is stealthily i.e. by understating its consequences.  Consequently, British 
politicians find it very difficult to justify Europeanization to the body politic because it 
is almost always viewed as an irrecoverable loss of national sovereignty.  The first 
fifteen years of membership were really just one long damage limitation exercise, 
aimed at securing a more favourable financial settlement while limiting EU 
competence.  This created a huge problem for civil servants and Ministers who had to 
involve themselves positively in new institutional processes while at the same time 
limiting their development. Not surprisingly, these wider political currents buffeted 
British-EU environmental relations.  Encumbered by the path dependent effects of  7 
having innovated early (it has one of the oldest environmental protection measures in 
the world) and the anti-environmental attitudes of many cognate departments, the DoE 
invested more time in seeking to resist EU initiatives, other than in a very small number 
of areas (e.g. waste, seals or lead in petrol) where European policies either built upon or 
worked alongside existing British policy. 
 
Is Britain more ‘European’ today?  Socially and culturally, probably yes (Gorton Ash, 
2001).  In terms of the way it administers and transacts European policy, Britain is a 
model of ‘good governance’.  It prepares carefully for meetings, has a ‘Rolls Royce’ 
mechanism for co-ordinating issues across Whitehall, and an enviably good record of 
implementing legislation (Wallace, 1995; 1997; Weale et al., 2000, 320).  But in terms 
of its political commitment to Europe, Britain remains somewhat detached, outside 
‘Euroland’.  Under Blair, Britain has sought to strengthen the EU’s foreign and defence 
policy capabilities, but for many British people, ‘Europe’ is what takes place across the 
English Channel in the continent of Western Europe; “it is them, not us” (Gorton Ash, 
2001, 11).  
 
Attitudes to the environment 
Politically speaking, the British have tended to view ‘environmental policy’ in slightly 
narrower and more negative terms than other industrialized northern European states.  
British policy in 1970 was narrow in the sense that it only addressed a small subset of 
environmental concerns i.e. those that were predominantly human health related.  It was 
negative for two reasons.  First, when it entered the EU, Britain was very much an 
environmental pioneer in Europe.  Having created some of the world’s first air 
pollution policies in the nineteenth century and established the world’s first 
environment ministry in 1970, it felt immensely self satisfied.  A DoE guide intended 
“to help those abroad who are concerned to understand the operation of pollution 
control here” claimed that Britain was “at a comparatively advanced stage of 
development and adoption of environmental protection policies” (DoE, 1978, 1).  In 
effect, the DoE told the Commission not to waste its time developing EU proposals 
because Britain was “well placed to cope with its own environmental problems” (in: 
Evans, 1973, 43).  Many members of the British political establishment opposed the EU 
on the basis that it was new and untested, whereas domestic policy in areas such as the  8 
environment had achieved a superior level of fitness, through “160 years of our own 
history” (Ashby and Anderson, 1981, 513). 
 
These slightly jingoistic sentiments were reinforced by a strong belief that the locus of 
policy would and should continue to reside in Britain, with international action only as 
and where absolutely necessary.  In 1980, Nigel Haigh (1984, xx) “shared a view 
widely held – and certainly held within the [DoE] - that Community environmental 
policy had had little or no effect on Britain.”  But behind this “proud” façade (Hajer, 
1995), British environmental policy was long on nature conservation policy, but short 
on air and water pollution measures.  The pattern of pressure group activity supported 
and in many respects exacerbated this trend (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001a/b).  Thus, 
‘insider’ pressure groups like the RSPB and Birdlife employed non-confrontational 
style techniques gently to influence the content of national policy.  Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth on the other hand, did not really arrive on the political scene until 
the 1980s.  Operating from a position that was self-consciously ‘outside’ central 
government, they forcefully demanded radically better waste and pollution control 
policies, and spurned offers to enter into a dialogue with government. 
 
Second, environment has tended to occupy an insecure niche in British party politics.  
Every now and again, there is a periodic burst of political attention (e.g. in the late 
1960s, which culminated in the creation of the DoE), but for the most part, most British 
politicians have regarded the environment as a politically unimportant and largely self-
contained area of policy.  Consequently, environmental matters tend to be pushed away 
from the nerve centres of government (e.g. the Cabinet Office) and out to the DoE or 
down to technical agencies.  The DoE has not, until recently, been that environmentally 
minded (Jordan, 2003), being an amalgam of local government and transport functions 
than an effective champion of environmental protection across central government.   
Politically speaking, it also a relatively weak department: Dunleavy (1995, 310), for 
example, places the Secretary of State for the Environment in the lower third of the 
Cabinet ‘pecking order’.  Even today, most parts of Whitehall regard the environment 
as the DoE’s responsibility (Jordan, 2000) – until, that is, it impinges on their ‘turf’ 
when it is very fiercely resisted.  Robin Sharp (1998, 55), the former Head of the DoE’s 
international environmental division has cogently remarked that “[t]here are many 
environmental assumptions, right or wrong, that have to be argued within [Whitehall]  9 
that simply appear to be self-evident in the German or Dutch context.”  In the past, 
most parts of Whitehall have sacrificed environmental quality in order to address the 
overriding social-political problem – reversing Britain’s comparative economic decline 
(Weale et al., 2000, 254).  Given that many elites in Britain still view economy and 
environment in a zero rather than a positive-sum game, the logical way to address this 
decline is by removing environmental barriers to growth.  Or, to put it another way, the 
philosophy of ecological modernization has taken considerably longer to take root in 
Britain than other comparable EU states (Weale, 1992, 82-8; Weale et al. 2000, 183-4). 
 
4.  The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy 
In the late 1990s, I observed (Jordan, 1998) that British policy had developed a number 
of new features.  If we look at what we have in this book defined as the content of 
national policy, there is a more consistent and formal system of administrative control 
based upon fixed standards and timetables of compliance, rather than administrative 
rules of thumb.  There are many more source-based, emission controls, and a greater 
readiness to enunciate the underlying principles and objectives of control such as 
precaution, prevention or sustainability.  Finally, policy makers are more willing to 
experiment with non-regulatory instruments such as environmental taxes and, more 
recently, tradable permits.  In terms of policy structures, powers have shifted from local 
regulators to officials at higher (e.g. EU) levels of governance.  Finally, the style of 
environmental regulation has become much more open and transparent, with greater 
public access to environmental information. 
 
However, in 1998, I added that the process of change has been evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary.  Thus, if we look at the content of many policies, there is still a strong 
attachment to informal gentleman’s agreements and non-quantified standards.  Central 
government is still reluctant to set clear and legally binding targets other than those 
specifically required by EU or international legislation.  Environmental taxes and 
voluntary agreements are beginning to appear (Jordan, 2002b), but the vast majority of 
environmental policy instruments are still regulatory.  New departmental structures 
have been created (e.g. the fusion of the departments of transport and environment to 
form DETR in 1997), but they are not significantly different from what preceded them.  
The most marked change is to be found in the regulation of public utilities such as 
energy and water, which are now regulated at arms-length from government, by non- 10 
departmental public bodies.  Finally, the style of policy making is more transparent, but 
is still more secretive than many other EU states.  In relation to Richardson’s schema, 
British environmental policy is still overwhelmingly consensual rather than adversarial 
(i.e. administrative discretion continues to prevail over judicial interpretation) (see: 
Vogel, 1986).  It is also predominantly reactive - the political and legal status of the 
precautionary principle (one of the fundamental precepts of ecological modernization) 
remains unclear. 
 
To what extent can we attribute these changes to the EU’s influence?  Or, are they 
symptoms of more systematic social and economic changes at the national level and 
international level?  Of the ‘domestic’ drivers the most salient are inter alia: the 
continuing growth in public awareness; pressure exerted by national bodies (e.g. the 
Royal Commission on environmental pollution) and various Parliamentary select 
committees; an increasingly large and sophisticated network of environmental pressure 
group; the ideological preference (by and large maintained by Labour (1997-) for free 
market competition and the modernization of the state; the continuing 
internationalization of the environmental agenda, particularly in the area of climate 
change.  The most important ‘international’ drivers are international agreements 
brokered in the UN, overseas bodies like the OECD and broader, deliberative fora such 
as the mega-environmental conferences in Stockholm and Rio.  These have 
disseminated new ideas and concepts as well as more specific emission reduction 
targets and timetables.  These factors would almost certainly have influenced domestic 
environmental policy irrespective of Britain’s membership of the EU. 
 
4.1  The Europeanization of British environmental policy content 
More than anyone else, Nigel Haigh has sought to uncover the extent to which EU and 
national policy co-exist within the same political space.  Over ten years ago he made 
the radical claim that: 
 
“[N]ot many areas of [UK environmental] policy have now been left entirely 
untouched by the [EU] even if the depth of involvement remains uneven. Some 
fields such as the control of hazardous chemical substances have largely been 
defined by [EU] policy.  Others, such as pollution of air and water, while 
profoundly affected by [EU] concepts, retain distinctively national  11 
characteristics. In contrast, town and country planning... has been much less 
influenced by the [EU]” (Haigh, 1992, v). 
 
These changes have occurred at all three levels of policy content.  In terms of policy 
paradigms, the EU has forced Britain to adopt a more preventative, source-based 
approach to policy making.  The conflict came to a head when, in 1974, the 
Commission proposed to regulate the emission of dangerous substances to water.  After 
a long and acrimonious struggle, driven as much by Britain’s determination to protect 
the interests of its domestic industry as defend the intellectual coherence of its approach 
or improve environmental quality per se, a compromise of sorts was incorporated into 
the 1976 Dangerous Substances Directive.  Around this time, Britain was clearly out of 
step with the rest of the EU, because no sooner had this philosophical conflict been 
delicately resolved, than a similarly bitter conflict erupted over the application of 
emission limits (this time enshrined within the principle of best available technology 
(BAT)) to acidic gases.  This time Britain was forced to compromise in the face of 
concerted opposition from a number of more environmentally ambitious EU and non-
EU states.  Crucially, the EU provided a forum for discussing emission reduction 
targets (a process which had been continuing in international level meetings) and the 
policy tools and timetables for achieving them (i.e. emission reduction targets based on 
the BAT).  The acid rain saga powerfully demonstrates how the EU intrudes much 
further into domestic practice than international bodies.  In this case, the EU made the 
objectives of national policy more environmentally ambitious, it specified the 
instruments to be used to achieve them, and the manner in which they should be 
applied. 
 
It would, of course, be wrong to characterize British policy as being entirely driven by 
an environmental quality objective approach, since there was, as Haigh argues (1992, 
3.9), always an element of precaution in the British approach (e.g. for certain emissions 
to air).  Be that as it may, the days of the contextual paradigm were numbered.  While it 
might have served the immediate needs of an island state, it was simply too 
unsystematic in terms of burden sharing and hugely over reliant upon local 
interpretation and enforcement, to have served as a model for the whole of the EU.  
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So, should we conclude that the EU has forced Britain to adopt a more precautionary, 
source-based paradigm of policy making?  There are several reasons for thinking not.  
First, to paraphrase Albert Weale (1997, 105), Britain has almost certainly lost a policy 
approach but it has not yet found a new policy paradigm to replace it.  Even in the late 
1990s, Britain was still not wholly committed to ecological modernization and felt 
distinctly uneasy about adopting strongly precautionary policies (O’Riordan, Cameron 
and Jordan, 2001) to reduce the emission of certain polluting substances, except when it 
was economically favourable or at least supportive of a more politically ambitious 
environmental policy (e.g. climate change).  A more accurate characterization is one of 
deep change with important elements of continuity both in Britain and the EU.  We can 
see this reflected in the way that Britain succeeded in shaping the IPPC and water 
framework Directives to incorporate elements of an environmental quality objective 
(EQO) approach to policy.  However, this paradigmatic shift was only partly the result 
of Britain’s increasingly effective efforts to shape the EU by uploading policy ideas 
(c.f. the debate over the most dangerous substances, above), because other EU states 
were in any case more willing to apply the EQO approach to less polluting substances. 
 
Second, the extent of the change varies greatly across the various sectors of British 
policy.  So, for example, air, noise, water and chemicals policy now largely incorporate 
strong source-based controls as a direct result of EU requirements, whereas land use 
planning and biodiversity protection still (though by no means exclusively) reflect 
traditional, British notions of environmental problem solving (i.e. a gradual negotiation 
of protection targets, rather than the specification a priori of an absolute level of 
environmental protection regardless of the economic costs).  Domestic and European 
waste policy developed concurrently, so the EU-effect is a mixture of top down and 
bottom up (see below).  These variations can be accounted for by: the depth and 
longevity of the EU’s involvement (high in water/air, lower in planning/biodiversity); 
the institutional embeddedness of national models (ditto); the DoE’s behaviour in 
Europe (i.e. a proactive policy shaper in IPPC, waste and (to a lesser extent) 
biodiversity, or a reactive, policy ‘taker’ (e.g. water)). 
 
Finally, it is debatable whether the pre-existing British approach was ever really a 
paradigm in the Kuhnian sense of a narrow, confining cognitive framework (Jordan and 
Greenaway, 1998).  It is probably more accurate to view it as a set of politically and  13 
economically expedient tools, which were only worked up into a broader ‘philosophy’ 
in the late 1970s by British officials seeking to justify the status quo to foreign 
observers (c.f. Haigh 1989, p.22).  In other words, we could say that Europeanization 
actually exacerbated the differences between British and EU policy.  
 
In terms of policy tools, the EU has led directly to the adoption of more source-based 
controls, as well as more formal environmental quality standards for certain air and 
water pollutants.  These reflect the EU’s preference for more harmonized and 
precautionary-based policies.  However, for reasons that are widely known, the EU’s 
toolbox is still predominantly regulatory.  Consequently (and with a number of 
exceptions), one has to look to domestic and international drivers to explain the recent 
proliferation of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments such as voluntary agreements 
and eco-taxes in Britain (Jordan, 2001a) (although the EU has supported the use of 
‘softer’ approaches to policy making in Action Programmes (e.g. ‘shared 
responsibility’ in the Fifth), Communications (e.g. on voluntary agreements, 1996) and 
White Papers (e.g. Governance, 2001). 
 
Finally, the precise setting of policy instruments has been directly affected by the EU.  
The EU has almost certainly tightened emission standards and formalized their 
achievement by setting strict deadlines.  The style in which instruments are calibrated 
has also changed, as has structural context in which it takes place.  In the past, the 
ability to constantly fine-tune the setting of policy instruments to reflect local needs and 
circumstances was highly prized by British pollution control elites.  The margin for 
adjustment has decreased dramatically as more and more standards are set within the 
Environment Council.  This has eroded the administrative discretion of local officials, 
whose task nowadays is faithfully to implement EU policies adopted centrally, rather 
than to ‘create’ policy ‘bottom up’ in Britain. 
 
A number of more general patterns can be identified in the continuing Europeanization 
of national policy.  First, the EU-effect is most clear-cut in relation to policy 
instruments and settings, reflecting the Commission’s primary status as a regulatory 
body (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 291-2).  The EU’s influence as a source of paradigm 
change is much more difficult to quantify, given the factors listed above.  More often 
than not, we find the EU acting as an institutional mechanism through which the  14 
greener member states have exported a more precautionary paradigm to other parts of 
Europe. 
 
Second, for the reasons set out above, Britain spent much of the 1970s and 1980s 
downloading paradigms and tools uploaded by other countries.  Why was this?  At first 
(c. 1972-1976) it regarded the EU as unsophisticated but essentially benign.  Several 
important Directives (e.g. wild birds, bathing and drinking water) were negotiated by 
relatively junior Ministers and civil servants, who (mistakenly) believed that they were 
statements of good intent (Jordan, 1999).  With some exceptions (lead in petrol, seals, 
chemicals and possibly birds), Britain was content to sit back and be a European policy 
‘taker’ rather than a ‘shaper’.  When (c. 1976-1988) Britain began to better appreciate 
the speed of integration and the pervasiveness of its Europeanizing effects, it tried to 
block the EU’s influence by vetoing proposals in the Environment Council (e.g. large 
combustion plants, ozone depletion, EIA and dumping at sea) or subverting Directives 
at the implementation stage (e.g. bathing, drinking water etc.) (Fairbrass and Jordan, 
2001b). 
 
When, like King Knut, it discovered that it could not hold up its hands and block the 
incoming tide of Europeanization, it set about trying to shape Europe by uploading 
policies to Brussels (c. post 1988).  The exports reflected traditional British strengths 
(e.g. IPPC, environmental policy integration) or its preference for non-regulatory 
instruments (e.g. ecolabels, EMAS etc.).  We might also include structural innovations 
(such as IMPEL and, perhaps even the European Environment Agency), which fitted 
Britain’s traditional concern about achieving good governance.  As it cast around for 
ideas and policies to upload to the EU, the DoE naturally gravitated towards the things 
it was already good at i.e. establishing broad procedures and policy structures as a 
framework for local action (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 287).  In any case, these process-
related functions were much more uploadable than traditional pollution control 
arrangements, which misfitted with what the EU was trying to achieve.  Importantly, 
the DoE made a very conscious, departmental decision to shape the EU in Britain’s 
image (Jordan, 2002a; 2003).  But in order to make the transition from policy taking to 
policy shaping, the DoE first had to learn to rely less on the formal (i.e. 
intergovernmental) apparatus of the Council (e.g. COREPER), as well as learn 
communautaire bargaining tactics (as opposed to just sheltering behind the national  15 
veto), colonize new institutional venues (e.g. the European Parliament) and develop 
new links (e.g. bilaterally with other Environment departments). 
 
Third, the pattern of projection and reception is broadly consistent with the pre-existing 
content, style and structure of Britain policy.  Thus, British exports have tended to be 
related to the more structural elements of policy (matters of “process and machinery 
(e.g. implementation (IMPEL), EPI (the Cardiff process), IPPC and subsidiarity)), in 
contrast to the emission (e.g. acid rain) and production targets (e.g. packaging waste) 
uploaded by the Germans in the 1980s.  Similarly, Britain has been better at uploading 
policies/ideas in areas of existing expertise (biodiversity) (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001a) 
or which developed concurrently with EU policies (e.g. waste) (Porter, 1998).  Its 
inability and/or unwillingness to upload policies from similarly well established 
domains in the 1970s (such as water and air pollution control) was due to the 
Eurosceptical orientation of national politics at the time, the path dependent effects of 
innovating early (‘first mover disadvantages’) and the basic inapplicability of the 
British model/paradigm of environmental policy to continental geographical contexts. 
So, to conclude, we can say that the EU has: 
•  Altered the paradigm of British policy, by forcing Britain to defend its overall 
approach to environmental protection and justify the underlying principles of 
action, many of which were arcane, implicit or merely rhetorical.  More 
specifically, the EU has helped to erode the contextual policy paradigm by 
enunciating fixed numerical standards and deadlines to ensure comparability of 
effort 
•  Changed the objectives of British policy by exerting a strong, upward pressure 
on domestic environmental standards and accelerated the pace of remedial 
work.  It has forced issues such as drinking water on to the domestic political 
agenda that were previously neglected or actively downgraded. On the 
implementation side, the EU has constrained the Government’s freedom to 
pursue independent policies, disavow promises or defer expensive clean up 
operations. 
•  Brought Britain into contact with new instruments and influenced the manner in 
which it applies existing tools.  The EU has forced Britain to give administrative 
devices such as water quality objectives legal backing and to approach industrial  16 
permitting on a more consistent, sector-by-sector basis.  Completely new tools 
such as air quality standards and emission ‘bubbles’ have been introduced to 
comply with EU requirements. 
 
4.2.  The Europeanization of British environmental policy structures 
It is considerably harder to identify a clear ‘EU effect’ on national structures.  The most 
obvious organizational changes made to the hardware of government have included the 
creation of a permanent representation (UKREP) in Brussels (one or two officials 
shadow the work of the Environment Council), the establishment of a European 
coordinating unit in the DoE, the development of new rules and codes for reaching 
agreement across Whitehall, and the creation of parliamentary committees in the House 
of Commons and the Lords to oversee the work of the executive (Bulmer and Burch, 
1998; Kassim, 2000; 2001b).  Otherwise, British environmental structures have hardly 
changed at all to accommodate European logics (Jordan, 2001d).  If anything, the basic 
institutional ‘logic’ of policy making in Whitehall remains essentially undiminished.  
For instance, the ‘Rolls Royce’ system of inter-departmental coordination in Britain 
was only very marginally adapted following EU membership, and has changed very 
little since then.  Similarly, new procedures have been developed to enable national 
Parliament to scrutinize the EU policy work of Whitehall departments, but they are 
strikingly similar to those governing national policy.  EU pressures also contributed to 
the need for Parliamentary reform (e.g. the creation of select committees) (Giddings 
and Drewry, 1996), but they were certainly not the primary cause (Rasmussen, 2001, 
158).  Longstanding concerns about Parliament’s ability to scrutinize the work of the 
executive have been exacerbated by Europeanization.  With the exception of the small 
number of in-depth studies conducted by the House of Lords select committee on EU 
affairs each year, most EU proposals receive very little parliamentary scrutiny. 
 
However, authors who have looked at Europeanization of organizational cultures 
suggest that the EU has made departments such as MAFF, the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Foreign Office much more ‘European’ in their attitudes and 
expectations through their entanglement with European policy making processes 
(Buller and Smith, 1998).  Hugo Young (1998, 412) makes the telling point that: 
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“It is the fate of modern British governments, however sceptic they are in theory, 
to be in practice ‘European’.  The facts of life are European.  Europe shapes the 
everyday reality with which all public people have to grapple… The existence of 
the [EU] is a condition infusing the bloodstream of every official and politician.  
But it reaches deepest into the life of Ministers especially.  Where others protest 
and complain, Ministers act.” 
 
Research reveals that the DoE has indeed ‘learnt’ new, more communautaire tactics 
(see above), established new alliances (see above) and, most profoundly of all, adopted 
a new (i.e. more environmental and more European) departmental political interest or 
‘departmental view’ (Jordan, 2002a).  Europeanization has undoubtedly strengthened 
the hand of the DoE, but the department did not set out use the EU with this purpose in 
mind.  On the contrary, empowerment via Europeanization was largely a serendipitous 
outcome, reaped but not specifically sown by the department (see above).  Rather, the 
DoE was empowered against its will through the combined activities of European 
actors and national pressure groups.  The DoE then found, to its surprise, that it could 
use external, EU requirements to extend the scope of national environmental protection 
by working through (rather than around) national coordinating mechanisms. 
 
However, when set alongside the raft of ‘machinery of government’ changes initiated 
by British governments in the 1980s and 1990s, the overall ‘EU effect’ on national 
structure is actually quite modest.  As part of a massive programme of institutional 
change and upheaval, the Conservatives slashed the civil service, privatized industries 
such as water and energy, and contracted out many central run functions to the market.  
These changes had a huge impact on Britain’s European environmental policy (e.g. the 
privatization of the utilities provided the funds needed to comply with water and air 
pollution Directives that ‘misfitted’ massively with national practices (Jordan, 1998)).  
Similarly, the EU was an important factor in the establishment of a national 
Environment Agency, though by no means the decisive one (Jordan, 2003).  Finally, the 
negotiation of international environmental regimes on issues such as climate change 
and acid rain would, in all probability, have forced the DoE to take on a greater central 
steering role irrespective of the EU’s involvement.  In the past, local level pollution 
controls were negotiated in a very ad hoc and unsystematic (i.e. location specific) 
manner.  International agreements, on the other hand, require states to formulate long- 18 
term, national emission reduction plans, which then have to be consistently and 
rigorously applied by sub-national bodies.  National officials must tailor policy 
instruments to achieve these reduction targets, whereas before they used their 
independent, professional judgement to tailor them to local conditions (e.g. the 
financial profitability of a polluting factory).  Consequently, powers that used to be 
exercised locally have had to be centralized by central government, to ensure that 
national targets brokered in the EU are achieved. 
 
The impact of the EU is probably most clearly inscribed on national legal structures 
(Macrory, 1987; 1991), which have become more formal and specific in terms of the 
objectives to be achieved (Bridge, 1981).  In fact, national law was probably one of the 
first elements of British practice to be Europeanized via the doctrines of supremacy and 
direct effect.  Like other Member States, British government and politics were 
extremely slow to adjust to the rapid and largely unforeseen “transformation” (i.e. 
constitutionalization) of the EU legal system (Alter, 2001, 183) (see above).  Indeed, 
throughout the 1970s, central government sought to reduce the extent of change by 
employing administrative circulars to implement EU requirements instead of 
legislation.  That practice has been discontinued following ruling by the ECJ.  Of 
course the written word of EU law also has to be interpreted and implemented by 
national enforcement bodies such as the Environment Agency.  Therefore, any 
assessment of the Europeanization of legal structures must also include the associated 
affects on the overall style of national policy making and implementation. 
 
To conclude, Nigel Haigh’s thesis that EU Directives have centralized power in Britain 
(Haigh, 1986) is still extremely apposite, but it needs to be seen against the backdrop of 
a raft of recent and hugely important domestic-international drivers of structural change 
in Britain.  So yes, it is true that the logic of integration has shifted more policy making 
up to the European level, eroding the power of local regulatory officials.  But, the 
organizational landscape of British environmental policy would have had to change 
regardless of Europeanization, not least to fit the new public management aspirations of 
successive Conservative governments in the 1980s and 90s.  Who have been the main 
winners and losers?  Europeanization has empowered some national environmental 
groups, which were previously excluded from national policy networks (Lowe and 
Ward, 1998, 295; Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001a/b).  In the 1980s, DG-Environment  19 
actively cultivated them to legitimate legal actions arising from the misfit between EU 
and national policy.  There have been two main losers: national parliament (which 
struggles to audit policy making in Brussels) (Armstong and Bulmer, 1996, 275; 
Giddings and Drewry, 1996) and local-level technocrats (whose professional discretion 
and influence has been greatly circumscribed). 
 
Therefore, in terms of policy structures, the EU has undeniably: 
•  helped to centralize into the hands of national and supranational officials 
responsibilities for setting standards, determining priorities and making 
investment decisions that were once exercised at a very local level. 
•  altered the way that British officials at all levels conduct their work.  After an 
initial period of hesitation, the DoE has been forced to operate more proactively 
in European policy networks and adapt to a system of joint-decision making in 
which Ministers increasingly build alliances with their opposite numbers in 
other states (see below). 
 
4.3  The Europeanization of British environmental policy style 
There are two aspects to policy style: the style of British policy in Britain, and the style 
of the British in the EU.  The style in which contemporary British environmental policy 
is enunciated and implemented is undeniably very different to that described in c.1970, 
namely negotiative and reactive (Jordan and Richardson, 1982, 81; 1983).  We have 
already noted the trend towards greater explicitness, more formalism and greater pro-
action (prevention).  However, there are many contributory factors in the shift towards 
what has been termed a “new politics” of pollution control in Britain (Weale, 1992), of 
which the EU is only one.  For instance, the politicization of environmental politics 
(itself accelerated by Europeanization) has perturbed the quasi-secretive world of 
pollution control, as has the advent of public registers of information, mechanisms of 
judicial review and (most recently of all) the incorporation of the European Convention 
of Human Rights into British law.  New public management has also ushered in a much 
more open and formal style of regulation, although arrangements are still in a state of 
great flux.  In the last five years, both OFWAT and OFGAS (who regulate the price of 
water and gas) have  openly challenged the basis of environmental policy decisions on 
wastewater treatment and climate change respectively.  In so doing they have helped to  20 
create a more open and publicly accountable system of regulation, which has forced 
central government departments to lay bare the financial calculations underpinning 
environmental standards.  Finally, industry too has realised that tougher and more 
independent regulation plays well with customers, employees, shareholders and 
potential investors because it demonstrates compliance with the best practice.  Many 
large companies are beginning to divulge information voluntarily, although smaller 
companies still have a long way to go. 
 
Overall, the domestic policy has changed greatly since the 1970s, but it is has not been 
transformed and there is no obvious shift towards a common, European policy style (if 
such a thing even exists) (Lowe and Ward, 1998, 290).  There is certainly little 
evidence of an imminent phase change to a more adversarial style of policy in Britain; 
informal negotiation and game playing are still the lifeblood of British environmental 
regulation.  Court proceedings are, in any case, expensive and judicial review 
procedures are long, expensive and uncertain as to their outcome.  That British 
environmental groups have often found it more productive to exploit the lobbying 
opportunities in Brussels than London, is a good indication that ‘club’ government is 
still alive and well in Britain, albeit in a political system transformed by 
Europeanization.  The EU’s impact on style appears to have been more contingent than 
direct.  Europe has certainly helped to open up the British system of regulation to 
greater external scrutiny and reduced the discretion once enjoyed by local officials.  For 
instance, the level of sewage treatment, once a matter for local control, is largely 
prescribed by the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, which was negotiated in 
Brussels by Ministers and DoE officials. 
 
To a large extent, the British have carried this style of working into Brussels 
(Christoph, 1993).  Britain sees itself as a ‘a hard negotiator but a dutiful implementer’ 
of EU legislation (Wallace, 1997); British negotiators like to think that they make the 
EU work by injecting a dose of common sense, whereas other, supposedly more 
‘European’ states, tend to slip into an “easy rhetoric” about the merits of European 
integration (Wallace, 1995, 47).  They have advocated the use of a more consultative 
and bargained style of working, using white and green papers, as well as broader, 
framework Directives, and economic appraisal techniques.  However, Britain’s 
opposition to the more impositional and proactive demands of other states, has, on  21 
occasions, left it looking distinctly ‘awkward’ and anti-environmental.  In fact, some 
commentators have gone as far as to suggest that many of Britain’s European problems 
stem not from substantive inter-state differences, but contrasting styles of bargaining 
and coalition building (Buller, 1995; Wallace, 1995).  For a variety of reasons (see 
above), the British find it immensely difficult to speak the language of Europe 
integration, because they see it as a zero-sum game played by (and between) sovereign 
states.  Consequently, they still tend to spend more time trying to defend a fixed 
national position in the Council (a task to which the highly polished but inflexible inter-
departmental coordination mechanisms are ideally suited), than developing broader 
alliances or shaping the all-important ‘pre-negotiation’ stages of the policy process. 
 
There are, however, signs that the British are employing a much more communautaire 
policy style in Brussels since Tony Blair’s election in 1997.  Labour’s more ‘engaged’ 
European policy stance has certainly made it easier to work inside the EU political 
system and upload policies.  Interestingly, the unexpectedly deep and politically painful 
Europeanization of environmental policy had forced the DoE to adopt this more 
‘European’ style in the early 1990s (i.e. well before the arrival of Blair).  This shift was 
made mainly pragmatic reasons – the department realised that it had to get a firmer grip 
on EU policy, or risk more and more policy misfits.  Being more proactively engaged, 
meant uploading more policies to Brussels (see above), using more communautaire 
language (‘yes, but’ to a Commission proposal rather than ‘no’) and employing 
‘corridor diplomacy’ (Jordan, 2002a) to achieve its departmental objectives.  In making 
these changes, the DoE has transformed itself into one of the most European 
departments in Whitehall (Buller and Smith, 1998).  In effect, the Europeanization of 
the content of national policy has forced the structures of government to adapt their 
styles of operation. 
 
Therefore, in terms of policy style, the EU has: 
•  created a more explicit and transparent framework of environmental protection, 
reinforcing the trend towards greater openness in regulation. 
•  encouraged greater environmental monitoring which has made policy more 
transparent.  22 
•  in several key areas (e.g. acid rain, marine pollution, ozone depletion etc.) made 
British policy considerably more anticipatory. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Britain’s struggle to come to terms with Europeanization in this sector, is really a 
symptom of the country’s long-term struggle “truly [to] accept that her modern destiny 
[is] to be a European country” (Young, 1998, 1).  As in so many other domestic sectors, 
Britain has taken a very long time to accept the EU as a benign force.  For long periods, 
the EU was regarded as an extraneous and unhelpful imposition, to be resisted if at all 
possible.  Consequently, Europeanization has generally proceeded via a series of deep 
political conflicts and unintended consequences, rather than in a smooth or evolutionary 
manner.  In the words of Prime Minister Blair (2001): 
 
“politicians of both parties have consistently failed… to appreciate the emerging 
reality of European integration. And in doing so, they have failed Britain’s 
interests…. The history of our engagement with Europe is one of opportunities 
missed in the name of illusions - and Britain suffering as a result.” 
 
Consequently, Britain has undergone a “retarded” form of Europeanization (Wallace, 
1997, 677), more on the EU’s terms, than Britain’s. 
 
The ‘EU-effect’ is most clearly inscribed upon the content of national environmental 
policy.  Its effect on national policy structures and policy styles has been heavily 
modulated by domestic factors, though the EU remains important as both a trigger of 
national action and a constraint upon the autonomy of national actors pursuing 
‘domestic’ policy objectives.  Without the EU, Britain would almost certainly have 
been forced to modernize its environmental policy.  However, the pace and depth of 
change would have been several orders of magnitude less. 
 
It is a measure of how Britain has been Europeanized that nowadays many national 
actors treat Europe as a given - “a banal, merely functional extension of the business of 
governing” in Britain (Young, 1998, 480).  But the question remains as to why 
Europeanization penetrated so deeply in a state with a minimalist view of integration 
and a very long history of environmental concern.  There are three possible answers to  23 
this puzzle.  First, the supposed progressiveness of British policy was always 
overstated, not least by the British in Brussels.  It is undeniably true that Britain had a 
well-established environmental policy prior to the EU’s involvement, but it was 
designed to achieve domestic policy goals.  In practice, it relied upon externalizing 
waste products along long pipes into the sea, or up chimneys into the atmosphere.  By 
innovating early, Britain suffered a ‘first mover disadvantage’, which hobbled it during 
the critical, early stages of the European ‘regulatory competition’.  The British model 
was disadvantageous because it could not easily be uploaded to other states, which had 
similar legal systems and shared many policy problems arising from their close 
geographical proximity.  The apparent success of the model at resolving some of 
Britain’s immediate environmental problems also created a feeling of self-satisfaction 
among officials and Ministers.  Instead of selling the model (or “approach”) (see: 
Waldegrave, 1985)
2 to the rest of the EU, Britain dug in and resisted innovations 
proposed by the Commission and other Member States. 
 
Second, Britain tried unsuccessfully to overcome ‘misfits’ by blocking the tide of 
Europeanization.  Very little sustained effort was made to exercise leadership by 
uploading policies to Brussels.  But in so doing, Britain suffered the fate of those that 
consistently download policy from the EU – namely implementation problems, policy 
misfits, and performance crises (Green Cowles et al., 2001, 8-9).  The impacts of the 
initial, strategic ‘mistake’ of trying to block Europeanization from the outside rather 
than working inside Europe to modulate the path of European integration, were 
enduring and self-reinforcing. 
 
Finally, Britain did not actually resist European integration as hard or as successfully as 
its minimalist reputation (i.e. hard negotiator, dutiful implementer) would imply.  The 
environment has never been a serious focus of conflict in British party politics, so it 
was understandable that so many of the early Directives were negotiated in a very 
relaxed manner.  The very weakly environmental government saw the environment as 
an unimportant, ‘sacrifice issue’ which could be traded for more important 
                                                 
2 It has been argued that Britain never possessed a coherent set of environmental policy principles, 
tools and ideas (Lowe and ward, 1998).  The British ‘approach’ was never a policy paradigm in the 
Kuhnian sense of a narrow, confining cognitive framework.  In fact, it owed its existence to the EU, 
being a post hoc justification for resisting the more disruptive effects of Europeanization (Jordan, 
2003).  24 
political/economic goals such as the single market or an opt-out in a cognate policy 
area (Jordan, 2001c; 2002a/b).  But EU environmental policy proved to be much more 
costly and self-perpetuating than Ministers had expected.  British environmental policy 
was therefore Europeanized indirectly, stealthily and largely contrary to the 
expectations of the British government. 
 
Eurosceptics will presumably argue that Britain should have been more not less 
sceptical if it wanted to avoid policy misfits and performance crises.  In contrast, 
Europhiles will no doubt claim that the story told above typifies everything that is 
wrong with British-EU affairs.  As long as Britain remains hesitant and unconvinced it 
will chase the game in Europe; the only reliable way to make Europe work for Britain 
is, as Blair (2001) recently claimed, to “exercise leadership in order to change Europe 
in the direction we want.”  The developments in this particular sector cast serious doubt 
on the ‘weakly Eurosceptical’ position, leaving two remaining courses of action: full 
disengagement or full engagement.  That thirty years after it first joined the EU Britain 
remains torn between these two options is perhaps the greatest and most fundamental 
paradox of all. 
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